.

[Eyes Wide Open + 3,555]

6 minutes ago, turbguy said:

That "break-up" will actually hamper reliability, as power cannot then be transmitted between microgrids. 

If you "connect" the microgrids together to share, you just end up with the "macro"grid you started with. 

"Islanding" of connected microgrids that serve critical infrastructure is just the same as designating which circuits are considered critical infrastructure that need to be exempt from load shedding actions.  Then, when you want to tie them back together, you gotta synch them up.

 

It is merely a matter of cost effectiveness, power generation is not rocket science. Although i will give anyone the fact green energy promotion/theory/salesmanship makes the automotive/financial markets look like rank amatures when it comes the Conn...LMAO

[turbguy + 1,543]

9 minutes ago, Eyes Wide Open said:

It is merely a matter of cost effectiveness, power generation is not rocket science. Although i will give anyone the fact green energy promotion/theory/salesmanship makes the automotive/financial markets look like rank amatures when it comes the Conn...LMAO

Frequently, cost effectiveness determination is elusive.  The addition of new nuclear generation is a good example.

 

In any event, let me introduce everyone to the largest cause of power outages in the USA, shown below...

 

Edited April 4, 2021 by turbguy

[Eyes Wide Open + 3,555]

2 minutes ago, turbguy said:

Frequently, cost effectiveness determination is elusive.  The addition of new nuclear generation is a good example.

In any event, let me introduce everyone to the largest cause of power outages in the USA, shown below...

 

Lol yes i do understand, living in Oregon and seeing how they maintain there lines it almost defies imagination..Later on i will take some pics of the power on my property, it will stun anyone except the liberal looney tunes of Portland..stay tuned.

[turbguy + 1,543]

34 minutes ago, Eyes Wide Open said:

Lol yes i do understand, living in Oregon and seeing how they maintain there lines it almost defies imagination..Later on i will take some pics of the power on my property, it will stun anyone except the liberal looney tunes of Portland..stay tuned.

Would be good to see what you have.  Mine's all underground.  There's not a wire exposed within 5 miles, unless you consider wire fences.   Even the UPRR put everything (signaling and power) underground.  Wise move.

Edited April 4, 2021 by turbguy

[Eyes Wide Open + 3,555]

22 minutes ago, turbguy said:

Would be good to see what you have.  Mine's all underground.  There's not a wire exposed within 5 miles, unless you consider wire fences.   Even the UPRR put everything (signaling and power) underground.  Wise move.

 

[turbguy + 1,543]

6 minutes ago, Eyes Wide Open said:

 

Vegetation management in order for sure.  I would notify/complain to your provider and politicians.  These photos (and location) alone should do the trick.

Could be worse...

 

[Richard D + 86]

On 4/3/2021 at 3:50 AM, turbguy said:

Did you mean CCGT?  The steam side, from cold, will probably take more than 15 minutes to reach full load from a unit start signal. The GT's, no problem with a 5 min start signal to full load.  That rapid a start will consume life of the hot parts somewhat, but that's business

Also, to achieve those high efficiencies, the GT's gotta run pedal-to-the-metal.  Part-load operation will have a penalty.

Gas engines,such as Jenbacher,are 50% efficient and are far simpler. A number operated in parallel would solve the part-load problem as some of the number could be switched off as demand falls.

[turbguy + 1,543]

1 hour ago, Richard D said:

Gas engines,such as Jenbacher,are 50% efficient and are far simpler. A number operated in parallel would solve the part-load problem as some of the number could be switched off as demand falls.

I agree, gas engines actually are good options, particularly for distributed generation (back-up gensets at nat gas processing sites).

I thought they WERE part of the nat gas infrastructure, but have been corrected.

[Dan Clemmensen + 1,011]

On 4/2/2021 at 5:33 PM, footeab@yahoo.com said:

I did some very brief "internet" surfing so called "research" for a different thread, about 6 months ago on this website, and the modern CGGT reach 80% load in under 5 minutes(under 2minutes generally speaking, but they guaranteed 5 minutes for cold start) and 100% load under 15 minutes.  So, for all practical purposes, expecting ~60+% efficiency overall for backup over a week would be deemed acceptable.  Likewise modern peakers are 40% efficient with a single stage turbine generator. 

This portion of our discussion was about Buffet's proposal for ten generators of 1 GW apiece to  act only as emergency backup. For this (probably unrealistic) use, we must assume peakers, not CCGT. Furthermore, if there is a turbine (or other) technology that has lower capital cost it will be preferred, even if it has reduced run time and/or reduced efficiency, because these generators will be used for only a few days total during their 40-year lifetimes.

[turbguy + 1,543]

1 hour ago, Dan Clemmensen said:

This portion of our discussion was about Buffet's proposal for ten generators of 1 GW apiece to  act only as emergency backup. For this (probably unrealistic) use, we must assume peakers, not CCGT. Furthermore, if there is a turbine (or other) technology that has lower capital cost it will be preferred, even if it has reduced run time and/or reduced efficiency, because these generators will be used for only a few days total during their 40-year lifetimes.

Such generation cannot just sit, waiting for the call, without periodic testing, qualification, and maintenance. 

For instance, batteries (for starting) will need replacement.  Elastomer parts will change properties and fail with age.

You might as well put the money into storage of some sort.

 

 

Edited April 4, 2021 by turbguy

[Dan Clemmensen + 1,011]

19 minutes ago, turbguy said:

Such generation cannot just sit, waiting for the call, without periodic testing, qualification, and maintenance. 

For instance, batteries (for starting) will need replacement.  Elastomer parts will change properties and fail with age.

You might as well put the money into storage of some sort.

 

 

No it cannot just sit, for those and other reasons. Neither can any other reliable reserve. you would need to fire these generators up maybe once a month for an hour (or whatever). But in the grand scheme of things, they will see very, very low utilization rates, Just like the backup diesel generators used by hospitals and data centers.  Sure, storage, but what storage do you propose that provides extreme reliability and seven days of storage at 1 GW (168 GWh) per site, and is understandable to the average state legislator? I think underground storage of NG coupled with winterization of existing NG generators plus adding a few NG peakers to get to a 15% reserve would work, but they will need to find a way to pay for it. The existing pure demand market just won't do it.

[turbguy + 1,543]

1 hour ago, Dan Clemmensen said:

No it cannot just sit, for those and other reasons. Neither can any other reliable reserve. you would need to fire these generators up maybe once a month for an hour (or whatever). But in the grand scheme of things, they will see very, very low utilization rates, Just like the backup diesel generators used by hospitals and data centers.  Sure, storage, but what storage do you propose that provides extreme reliability and seven days of storage at 1 GW (168 GWh) per site, and is understandable to the average state legislator? I think underground storage of NG coupled with winterization of existing NG generators plus adding a few NG peakers to get to a 15% reserve would work, but they will need to find a way to pay for it. The existing pure demand market just won't do it.

I would say a strong AC tie to other systems might be cheaper.

[Ward Smith + 6,615]

14 hours ago, turbguy said:

I would say a strong AC tie to other systems might be cheaper.

Interties aren't All they're cracked up to be. How would Texas like it if a power plant in Iowa takes the whole shebang down? Fun game, if you have 100 components in a complex system and each one has a 1% chance of catastrophic failure, what is your overall chance of failure?  😉

[Dan Clemmensen + 1,011]

21 hours ago, turbguy said:

I would say a strong AC tie to other systems might be cheaper.

If an extreme event covers a very wide area, interties may not help. This situation occurred in California last summer when extreme heat hit AZ at the same time it hit CA.

[Dan Clemmensen + 1,011]

7 hours ago, Ward Smith said:

Interties aren't All they're cracked up to be. How would Texas like it if a power plant in Iowa takes the whole shebang down? Fun game, if you have 100 components in a complex system and each one has a 1% chance of catastrophic failure, what is your overall chance of failure?  😉

Depends on the system.The chance of a single failure somewhere in the system is (1-.99^^100)=63.4%. If any single failure can take down the system, then the system is not designed properly.

[turbguy + 1,543]

Inter ties that might help are better than no inter ties at all.  If you don't got it, you don't share it.  If you do, you do. You just might be surprised how well they can work.

I the meantime, here come the lawyers...

https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Lawsuits-Pour-In-After-Texas-Freeze-Pushes-Bills-Sky-High.html

Edited April 5, 2021 by turbguy

[Ward Smith + 6,615]

18 hours ago, Dan Clemmensen said:

Depends on the system.The chance of a single failure somewhere in the system is (1-.99^^100)=63.4%. If any single failure can take down the system, then the system is not designed properly.

Next to impossible to design a failure proof system. There's entire disciplines dedicated to this. The problem with grids is the failures become cumulative exponentially. Add in weather events and things only get worse. Lawyers playing Monday morning quarterback with all the time in the world and no pressing emergency can always find fault, even when great engineers are busting buns to keep it all going. 

[Dan Clemmensen + 1,011]

1 minute ago, Ward Smith said:

Next to impossible to design a failure proof system. There's entire disciplines dedicated to this. The problem with grids is the failures become cumulative exponentially. Add in weather events and things only get worse. Lawyers playing Monday morning quarterback with all the time in the world and no pressing emergency can always find fault, even when great engineers are busting buns to keep it all going. 

I spent 40 years as a data communications systems architect. I am painfully aware of these disciplines. The worst problem is the one that nobody anticipated, which renders all those beautiful system models irrelevant. It's usually some form of common-mode failure. However, it's still an oversimplification to assert that system failure increases exponentially with complexity. This is mathematically true only for systems where the failure of any one component causes the whole system to fail.

 

[Ward Smith + 6,615]

4 minutes ago, Dan Clemmensen said:

I spent 40 years as a data communications systems architect. I am painfully aware of these disciplines. The worst problem is the one that nobody anticipated, which renders all those beautiful system models irrelevant. It's usually some form of common-mode failure. However, it's still an oversimplification to assert that system failure increases exponentially with complexity. This is mathematically true only for systems where the failure of any one component causes the whole system to fail.

 

True, but the electrical grid is like that. We're not talking transistors here, but power plants as "components". The whole reason FERC exists is to establish the framework for the interties so disasters can be mitigated. The harsh reality is, when things go boom the only plant defense is disconnect, and those disconnects cause a chain reaction that's hard to contain. Luckily the MTTF is much better than my simplistic example. Schweitzer Engineering Labs has done a great job supplying better components to minimize disasters that used to cripple systems. There's lots of small scale events that went exponential, they just didn't rise to the level of news worthy because they were contained. 

[turbguy + 1,543]

5 hours ago, Dan Clemmensen said:

I spent 40 years as a data communications systems architect. I am painfully aware of these disciplines. The worst problem is the one that nobody anticipated, which renders all those beautiful system models irrelevant. It's usually some form of common-mode failure. However, it's still an oversimplification to assert that system failure increases exponentially with complexity. This is mathematically true only for systems where the failure of any one component causes the whole system to fail.

 

Keep in mind that ERCOT's grid did not fail.  It's issue was mitigated. 

Edited April 7, 2021 by turbguy

[BakkenOil + 6]

Funny that everyone is pushing the fault onto “green” energy and not the fact that the idiots didn’t winterize their infrastructure. 

[Dan Clemmensen + 1,011]

1 hour ago, turbguy said:

Keep in mind that ERCOT's grid did not fail.  It's issue was mitigated. 

The ERCOT grid is one (enormous) part of the larger Texas energy delivery system. That energy delivery system failed, and more than 184 Texans died.

[turbguy + 1,543]

52 minutes ago, Dan Clemmensen said:

The ERCOT grid is one (enormous) part of the larger Texas energy delivery system. That energy delivery system failed, and more than 184 Texans died.

ERCOT's grid did not fail.  "Stumble badly" is perhaps a better description.  A totally black grid is a failure. 

With that logic, damage from hurricanes represent failures.

With that logic, Texas' public health system and it's politicians have failed as well, with results orders of magnitude greater.

 

[turbguy + 1,543]

2 hours ago, BakkenOil said:

Funny that everyone is pushing the fault onto “green” energy and not the fact that the idiots didn’t winterize their infrastructure. 

All sources of generation played a part, including wind.  Gas generation apparently played the largest "part".

Why?  Not know yet.

Root causes are still unverified.

Texas politicians will probably hold that info close to their chest.

 

[Dan Clemmensen + 1,011]

53 minutes ago, turbguy said:

ERCOT's grid did not fail.  "Stumble badly" is perhaps a better description.  A totally black grid is a failure. 

With that logic, damage from hurricanes represent failures.

With that logic, Texas' public health system and it's politicians have failed as well, with results orders of magnitude greater.

 

I agreed that the grid did not fail. The energy system as a whole failed.

No, most  hurricane damage is not a system failure: society expects the damage and has mechanisms to mitigate and recover.  Some hurricane damage is caused by systems failures. An example was damage in New Orleans caused by Katrina when the levees broke, which was predictable and predicted, just like the freeze-offs in Texas last month.

Yes, a case can be made that the political system in Texas (or the US, or the world) is broken, but those systems are beyond the scope of engineering failure analysis. the Texas energy system is not beyond the scope of engineering failure analysis. The engineering analysis done after the 2011 event identified freeze-offs and failure of non-winterized facilities as failure points.