Russia, Ukraine and "2022: The Year Ahead"

[Tomasz + 1,608]

This article says it all. Fake show of military power and fake western histeria to resolve conflict.

Its all created to force Ukrainians to finally accept reality.

I don't know how to say this in english- a bad guy threatens you with fake military force. A good guy informed you that he is on your side but you need to accept sad reality that he is powerless against this bad guy in Eastern Europe  so it's high time for you to talk with him seriously. Think about some real concessions because he had an upper hand in this region.

I know I'm cynical but world politics is about western interests not values and no one will go on war with Putin even economic one to defend country like Ukraine.

Ukraine is still in deep vital interests of Russia but much less Western powers that's all.

My geopolitical  guru is John Meisheimer and he said this back in 2014/2015.

Edited January 27, 2022 by Tomasz

[Tomasz + 1,608]

I wonder who wants war in Europe. Lets read this one conversation between Zelensky and Biden from CNN. What to think about this?

 

[Tomasz + 1,608]

From Kommersant 2/2/2022

Deck of "Ukrainian Cards" by Sergei Strokan on Kiev's search for new allies in the face of the disappointment of the US and the EU

The intensification of dialogue between Russia and the West on security issues has launched a process of radical reconfiguration of Ukraine's relations with the entire Euro-Atlantic community.
The main tectonic shift is that betting on American and European foreign policy projects is losing its former significance for Kiev. Washington is increasingly putting pressure on Kiev to abide by the Minsk accords, but Kiev is resisting, and mutual disappointment is mounting as a result. It was the United States and the European Union that the Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, Oleksiy Danilov, was told that the implementation of the Minsk agreements "will mean the destruction of the country." "They were signed in place of a Russian pistol, and Germany and France watched it, and even then it was clear to all sane people that these documents could not be implemented," Danilov said.
However, this recognition came after the Normandy Four met in Paris and agreed to hold another meeting in Berlin in February, as well as statements by both US President Joe Biden and Secretary of State Anthony Blinken that there was no alternative to the Minsk Accords.
Signs of obsolescence of US and pan-European projects are bad news for Kiev. But there is also good - conditionally good - news for Kiev. It is based on the fact that many countries in the West, East and the post-Soviet space have their own views on Ukraine and are ready to actively play the "Ukrainian card" to solve their own internal political and geostrategic tasks. You can see that they are realizing their ambitions, that each of them plays their "Ukrainian card", but this circumstance allows Kiev to demonstrate the appearances that Ukraine is gaining new opportunities and new room for maneuver in situational alliances and partnerships.
An illustration of this was the diplomatic pilgrimage to Kiev that we are witnessing this week. The prime ministers of Great Britain, Poland and the Netherlands, Canada's defense minister, have gathered in Kiev, and the Turkish president is also expected to be in the Ukrainian capital on the following day. And this is not a complete list of Kiev's guests.
It is in London's interest to demonstrate the feasibility of a "global Britain" strategy that should make the country not only the leader of the Anglo-Saxon world but also the new world center of power.
By playing the "Ukrainian card", Poland and the Netherlands are increasing their geopolitical capitalization. It turns out that they are playing in the same league with Great Britain, and at the same time they take on a special mission to protect Ukraine, which should increase their importance in the EU. Canada's interest lies above ground - the country has an influential Ukrainian diaspora. And finally, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has offered his mediation between Moscow and Kiev, is not giving up on trying to win the laurels of Greater Eurasia.
Against the background of solitaire, "Ukrainian cards" in Kiev began to talk about a promising strategy of small alliances, which also included the Lublin Triangle (Ukraine-Poland-Lithuania), the Associated Trio (Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova) and the Quadriga. "(Ukraine-Turkey).
However, at the same time, the thick Ukrainian deck can clearly be left with no aces.

[Tomasz + 1,608]

The Ukrainian community of experts realized the inevitability of the impending tectonic change in the national energy system. The launch of Nord Stream 2 will be a decisive factor which, according to Ukrainian observers, will deprive the current authorities in Kiev of any hope of extending the transit of Russian natural gas to Europe via Ukraine after 2024.
Ukraine is on the verge of a political choice that is extremely unpleasant for its current government, said political scientist Dmitry Korneichuk on the NewsOne TV channel (which was broadcast on Ukrainian TV a year ago) on Youtube. After the new Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline is launched, the country will be forced to buy natural gas directly from Russia, negotiating directly with Gazprom. At the same time, the Ukrainian political scientist noted that the authorities in Kiev are currently resorting to the notorious withdrawal of volumes from the transit pipeline, which will be turned off with the launch of Nord Stream 2, the capacity of which will allow Russia to limit its gas transit to the EU to zero.
And a deputy of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine from the Opposition Platform party - For life, Oleg Voloshin, on the air of the mentioned "subversive" channel from the point of view of the Kiev authorities, noted that the "only real way" to implement the Nord Stream 2 project will appear only in the event of a "colossal gulf" between the US and Germany, while imposing sanctions on German companies.
However, such actions by the American administration, as Wołoszyn himself suggested, would have long-term consequences for international relations. "It is pure piracy to interfere in matters that do not directly concern the United States," stressed the MP.
The Ukrainian economist, co-chairman of the Energy Strategies Fund, Dmitry Marunich, spoke even more categorically. On television, Nash said that Kiev must conclude an agreement directly with Gazprom, under which the Russian supplier will export gas directly to Ukraine. After all, now, guided by its purely political considerations, the country acquires an energy source sent to Europe via the territory of Ukraine from various intermediaries, overpaying for them. And high gas prices hurt the economy of Ukraine a lot.
Marunich recalled that the price for 1 cubic meter of natural gas, including VAT, is 60 hryvnia (around 160 rubles), and if this situation does not change, "the entire industry will stop soon", he said.
ALTERNATIVE
As an example, the expert referred to Hungary, which switched to direct cooperation with Gazprom and, since October 1, 2021, has been receiving the necessary quantities via the Balkan Stream gas pipeline connected to Turkish Stream.
By the way, last year Ukraine received 90% of imported gas from Hungary, the Ukrainian company GTS Operator reported. However, there is no doubt as to the original origin of these volumes, which, according to the economic logic of the Kiev authorities, could be delivered directly to Ukrainian consumers much cheaper.
However, the presence of yet another direct route for the supply of significant amounts of Russian natural gas to Germany will not in itself cancel the existing agreement under which Gazprom uses Ukraine's existing gas transmission system (GTS). But after its expiry, and thus the end of transit pumping of "blue fuel" through the territory of Ukraine, the transit country, even without taking into account the notorious "selection", will find itself in an extremely difficult situation. He will not be able to use the so-called The "virtual reverse", ie the system of offsets, under which Kiev formally buys gas in Europe, but de facto - surpasses some of the volumes received from Russia and originally intended for the EU even before leaving Ukraine. For Kiev, this means one thing:

WHERE IS THE DEMAND?
Thus, the Ukrainian side, for many reasons, is extremely sensitive to the prospect of losing transit flows of natural gas from Russia, which has been legally recognized by the Verkhovna Rada as "the country of the aggressor".
One of the clearest examples of the authorities' fear in Kiev about the loss of transit flows is the emotional statement made in December, in the spirit of contemporary Ukrainian politics, by the head of the "Ukrainian GTS Operator" Serhiy Makogon on the Facebook platform (which has almost become the main information platform for the present Ukrainian authorities) that Gazprom is blackmailing Europe without increasing transit through Ukraine.
In response to such statements and requests by the representatives of Kiev (and Washington, Brussels and Berlin who support it, also on this matter) to conclude a new transit agreement for a long period after 2024, the Russian side has repeatedly stated that such an agreement should suggest the existence of real demand in Europe as a region-consumer of delivered quantities. Thus, the director of the second department of the CIS countries of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Alexey Polishchuk at the end of December, responding to the statement by the President of Ukraine Vladimir Zelensky that Kiev is in favor of extending the "transit" contract after 2024, replied: "For obvious reasons, negotiations on the extension of the transit may be carried out only when there is a clear understanding of which of the partners will be ready to buy Russian gas, in what quantities and on what terms. The transport topic in this case is secondary. "
The position of the Russian side has a solid justification, dictated solely by the logic of market relations. And if the topic of the deterioration of the infrastructure of the Ukrainian GTS (whose credibility in the absence of additional investments may be questionable) is met with fierce contradictions by the authorities in Kiev, there is no clear answer to the question of what will there be a specific demand for the transit of Russian natural gas through Ukraine.

[Starschy + 211]

If you listen carefully, the US track back from Ukrainian war. It seems that the Military prevailed over the Foreign Ministry. War monger Antony Blinken was in Libya, Syria, Ukraine in the forefront.

The main reason for the US Military is the Ukraine lacks money. Germany provided 5000 Helmets. Meaning Ukraine lacks funds even for Basic equipment like Helmets and protective Vests. For both they asked Germany.

The Ukraine Military budget is about the same like Switzerland which is about 10 times smaller and don‘t need a Navy for 5 Billion CHF.

Ukraine has many large River to protect. Wiki shows at least 50 Rivers between 150 km and 1000 km length. For that you need a lot of smaller Boats like the ones from Finlands Kewatec Company.

But Ukraine lacks money even for 10 average Boats. In Total Ukraines River length is above 10000 km meaning even the Top 3 US Rivers are smaller combined.

Edited February 3, 2022 by Starschy

[surrept33 + 612]

       Op-Ed: Not all Russians buy Putin’s warmongering

https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2022-02-03/ukraine-russia-putin-biden-war

BY ANDREI KOLESNIKOV

 

Andrei Kolesnikov is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center and former managing director of Novaya Gazeta.

MOSCOW — 

In May 1993, Estonia’s first post-Soviet leader Lennart Meri — a wise man with bitter experience of life in the Soviet Union — told the visiting U.S. deputy secretary of state that Estonia urgently needed to join NATO. It was, he said, the only guarantee that Russia wouldn’t invade the Baltic state once a less Western-friendly and authoritarian Russian leader replaced then-President Boris Yeltsin.

Meanwhile, Yeltsin openly warned the U.S. that NATO’s expansion to the east would inevitably lead to an explosion in nationalist and imperialist sentiment in Russia. Some of Meri’s and Yeltsin’s predictions have come true. It took Vladimir Putin, prone to imperial obsession, to awaken Russians’ ultraconservative feelings, complete with phantom pain for the lost Soviet Union. The more the Russian president advances his Make Russia Great Again strategy, the more Russians are convinced that their country was humiliated following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Yet Putin’s recent buildup of military forces along Ukraine’s border has equally brought out Russians’ fears as tensions heighten. The Pentagon announced Wednesday that about 2,000 U.S.-based troops will be deployed to Poland and Germany, and another 1,000 soldiers from Germany are shifting to Romania, in a show of American commitment to NATO allies. The U.S. says it will not enter Ukraine. The view from Russia isn’t clear-cut.

Russians think highly of their government. In a recent poll, half of the respondents blamed the U.S. and other NATO countries for the escalation in eastern Ukraine. Sixteen percent said Ukraine initiated the escalation, and only 4% faulted Russia.

Such patriotic vision has led to an increase in recent years in the number of Russians who believe that the nation has enemies. Most cite the U.S. as the primary foe.

Things can change, however. As soon as international rifts diminish even a little, the attitudes of Russians to everything Western, above all toward the U.S. and the European Union, instantly become less hostile, and vice versa. As for NATO, perceptions of the alliance as an instrument of American power took root back in Soviet times.

Putin’s belligerent rhetoric and behavior have inspired ordinary Russians, but it has also frightened them. They worry about significant military threats from abroad, especially from the United States. In recent years, Russians have begun to fear another world war. It’s their second-biggest fear (after that of their loved ones becoming ill), according to a recent survey.

When Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, there was an unprecedented torrent of patriotic sentiment, embodied by Putin, whose ratings soared to record numbers. The vast majority of Russians believed that reincorporating Crimea — for many years part of the Russian republic formerly under the Soviet Union — simply righted a historical injustice. Although that consensus on Crimea still exists, it no longer inspires Russians to unconditionally support Putin. He can’t invoke that campaign to mobilize ordinary Russians to rally around the flag or boost his ratings again.

A war with Ukraine is no less complex. Indeed, Russians view their neighbor as a satellite of the West, but their opinion isn’t entirely negative. Last year, nearly a quarter of Russians believed their country and Ukraine should be friendly neighbors but still have their own borders. More than half of Russians between ages 18 and 24 have a positive or very positive attitude toward Ukrainians. It’s hard to imagine how those young people could be forced to take up arms against their neighbors with that attitude. The Kremlin has only increased worries about a military confrontation with the U.S. and NATO.

In recent years, the Russian public has gotten used to an atmosphere of constant tension. War has become routine and the West is still considered the enemy. But that could evolve rapidly if cooler heads prevail and tensions are dialed back.

In my recent research with focus groups, I found that the future of Russia, young people, are very pragmatic about their country’s situation. They’re concentrating on their private lives — going to school, getting a good job. Some are trying to adapt to political constraints and outwardly showing obedience, while secretly supporting jailed opposition leader Alexei Navalny, even if they don’t show it. They’re not interested in pursuing any war and are not particularly indoctrinated with Putinism.

The patriotic tantrums on television talk shows are mostly geared toward older demographics. Propaganda works, but many young people are immune to it; they’re mostly on social media. Liberal activists, bloggers and journalists are few in number but relatively influential. Take journalist Dmitry Muratov, for example, who won the Nobel Peace Prize last year. A lot of people also watch popular video bloggers such as Yury Dud, who has millions of YouTube subscribers, or follow other outlets like the independent TV channel Dozhd, which the Kremlin has designated as a “foreign agent,” or the liberal Ekho Moskvy radio station.

Most Russians, though, are apathetic. These days, there are fewer ardent supporters of Putin than indifferent ones. It’s far from a given that Russians will equate the autocrat with Russia and Russia’s security with that of the Kremlin’s inner circle. Today’s urbanized Russians don’t want to go and fight for Putin and the Kremlin. Invading Ukraine would not be seen as defending their country, and NATO, despite many claims from the Kremlin, is not Hitler.

 

[Andrei Moutchkine + 828]

2 hours ago, surrept33 said:

       Op-Ed: Not all Russians buy Putin’s warmongering

https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2022-02-03/ukraine-russia-putin-biden-war

BY ANDREI KOLESNIKOV

 

Andrei Kolesnikov is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center and former managing director of Novaya Gazeta.

MOSCOW — 

In May 1993, Estonia’s first post-Soviet leader Lennart Meri — a wise man with bitter experience of life in the Soviet Union — told the visiting U.S. deputy secretary of state that Estonia urgently needed to join NATO. It was, he said, the only guarantee that Russia wouldn’t invade the Baltic state once a less Western-friendly and authoritarian Russian leader replaced then-President Boris Yeltsin.

Meanwhile, Yeltsin openly warned the U.S. that NATO’s expansion to the east would inevitably lead to an explosion in nationalist and imperialist sentiment in Russia. Some of Meri’s and Yeltsin’s predictions have come true. It took Vladimir Putin, prone to imperial obsession, to awaken Russians’ ultraconservative feelings, complete with phantom pain for the lost Soviet Union. The more the Russian president advances his Make Russia Great Again strategy, the more Russians are convinced that their country was humiliated following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Yet Putin’s recent buildup of military forces along Ukraine’s border has equally brought out Russians’ fears as tensions heighten. The Pentagon announced Wednesday that about 2,000 U.S.-based troops will be deployed to Poland and Germany, and another 1,000 soldiers from Germany are shifting to Romania, in a show of American commitment to NATO allies. The U.S. says it will not enter Ukraine. The view from Russia isn’t clear-cut.

Russians think highly of their government. In a recent poll, half of the respondents blamed the U.S. and other NATO countries for the escalation in eastern Ukraine. Sixteen percent said Ukraine initiated the escalation, and only 4% faulted Russia.

Such patriotic vision has led to an increase in recent years in the number of Russians who believe that the nation has enemies. Most cite the U.S. as the primary foe.

Things can change, however. As soon as international rifts diminish even a little, the attitudes of Russians to everything Western, above all toward the U.S. and the European Union, instantly become less hostile, and vice versa. As for NATO, perceptions of the alliance as an instrument of American power took root back in Soviet times.

Putin’s belligerent rhetoric and behavior have inspired ordinary Russians, but it has also frightened them. They worry about significant military threats from abroad, especially from the United States. In recent years, Russians have begun to fear another world war. It’s their second-biggest fear (after that of their loved ones becoming ill), according to a recent survey.

When Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, there was an unprecedented torrent of patriotic sentiment, embodied by Putin, whose ratings soared to record numbers. The vast majority of Russians believed that reincorporating Crimea — for many years part of the Russian republic formerly under the Soviet Union — simply righted a historical injustice. Although that consensus on Crimea still exists, it no longer inspires Russians to unconditionally support Putin. He can’t invoke that campaign to mobilize ordinary Russians to rally around the flag or boost his ratings again.

A war with Ukraine is no less complex. Indeed, Russians view their neighbor as a satellite of the West, but their opinion isn’t entirely negative. Last year, nearly a quarter of Russians believed their country and Ukraine should be friendly neighbors but still have their own borders. More than half of Russians between ages 18 and 24 have a positive or very positive attitude toward Ukrainians. It’s hard to imagine how those young people could be forced to take up arms against their neighbors with that attitude. The Kremlin has only increased worries about a military confrontation with the U.S. and NATO.

In recent years, the Russian public has gotten used to an atmosphere of constant tension. War has become routine and the West is still considered the enemy. But that could evolve rapidly if cooler heads prevail and tensions are dialed back.

In my recent research with focus groups, I found that the future of Russia, young people, are very pragmatic about their country’s situation. They’re concentrating on their private lives — going to school, getting a good job. Some are trying to adapt to political constraints and outwardly showing obedience, while secretly supporting jailed opposition leader Alexei Navalny, even if they don’t show it. They’re not interested in pursuing any war and are not particularly indoctrinated with Putinism.

The patriotic tantrums on television talk shows are mostly geared toward older demographics. Propaganda works, but many young people are immune to it; they’re mostly on social media. Liberal activists, bloggers and journalists are few in number but relatively influential. Take journalist Dmitry Muratov, for example, who won the Nobel Peace Prize last year. A lot of people also watch popular video bloggers such as Yury Dud, who has millions of YouTube subscribers, or follow other outlets like the independent TV channel Dozhd, which the Kremlin has designated as a “foreign agent,” or the liberal Ekho Moskvy radio station.

Most Russians, though, are apathetic. These days, there are fewer ardent supporters of Putin than indifferent ones. It’s far from a given that Russians will equate the autocrat with Russia and Russia’s security with that of the Kremlin’s inner circle. Today’s urbanized Russians don’t want to go and fight for Putin and the Kremlin. Invading Ukraine would not be seen as defending their country, and NATO, despite many claims from the Kremlin, is not Hitler.

 

There is no "Putin's warmongering" Not even to the extent there was in 2014.

The alleged "forces build-up" is an obvious response to an even larger buildup of Ukrainian forces in Donbass.