James Regan + 1,776 February 23, 2020 (edited) 4 hours ago, Ward Smith said: Yes, I don't know if @Douglas Bucklandthoroughly read this report, but I did the moment it was released. Here's the salient point I was making Obviously the entire fustercluck was of epic proportions. Everything BP did was wrong, including doing the long string rather than a proper tie back, not waiting long enough for the cement to cure properly, skipping the logs etc. MMS bore some responsibility for rubber stamping everything without even looking at it, but as we've all seen, once you're in government service, you're a "made man" and will never be reprimanded for incompetence of any kind, nor ever fired. Obama knew the bunglecrats had messed up, so he "solved" it by renaming the department. All the same people doing all the same jobs but the "stench" stayed with the old name. Because people don't remember and reporters are stupid. The mud offload should not be confused to the point where if the mud was onboard it would have been used to kill the well. The mud circulating system got overloaded regardless of how much mud you had on board it was too late, no conventional well kill would have been fast enough for this brute even the Wait and Weight method considered the safest was impossible the primary well control was compromised and secondary was ineffective. The liner lap is the driver here and the false sense of security it gave. sorry Ward my reply appeared on the wrong post, I’m sure you will forgive me but post l feel still relevant towards to fact the offloading of the mud was a normal process. 👍🏻 To your point agree completely they were over keen to get to next location , I have seen posts regarding day rates and how it affected the decision this is completely false, the drive was to get to the next well to stay above or recoup overall project curve, these rigs were not going off contract they were turning to the right for BP indefinitely. Edited February 23, 2020 by James Regan Quote Share this post Link to post Share on other sites
Douglas Buckland + 6,308 February 23, 2020 “...well kill would have been fast enough for this brute even the Wait and Weight method considered the safest was impossible...” First, once you have lost control of the well, there is no accepted well control method that is applcable. These methods are only viable if you have successfully ‘caught’ the kick AND the volume of the influx is within your kick tolerance. Secondly, the ‘Wait and Weight’ method is not necessarily the safest. You generally use this method if your drillpipe volume is less than the open hole/drillpipe volume (so that kill weight mud enters the open hole before the influx ‘bubble’ reaches the last casing shoe AND your surface mixing capability will allow you to mix kill weight mud in a reasonable amount of time and in sufficient volume. Personally I prefer the Driller’s Method. Operations do not cease, the crew is kept busy, the influx is out of the well quicker and the well is continually being circulated. Quote Share this post Link to post Share on other sites
El Nikko + 2,145 nb February 23, 2020 (edited) 7 hours ago, Douglas Buckland said: Do the calculations for a cubic foot of influx and the volume that would have been when it reached the surface... I've been looking for that for ages and can't find it, saddly I lost a massive amount of collected resources over the years. Do you have the calculation? For some reason the number 278 keeps springing to mind, that might the the depth at which gas breaks out in OBM and expands massively close to surface? Edited February 23, 2020 by El Nikko Quote Share this post Link to post Share on other sites
Ward Smith + 6,615 February 23, 2020 5 hours ago, Douglas Buckland said: “...well kill would have been fast enough for this brute even the Wait and Weight method considered the safest was impossible...” First, once you have lost control of the well, there is no accepted well control method that is applcable. These methods are only viable if you have successfully ‘caught’ the kick AND the volume of the influx is within your kick tolerance. Secondly, the ‘Wait and Weight’ method is not necessarily the safest. You generally use this method if your drillpipe volume is less than the open hole/drillpipe volume (so that kill weight mud enters the open hole before the influx ‘bubble’ reaches the last casing shoe AND your surface mixing capability will allow you to mix kill weight mud in a reasonable amount of time and in sufficient volume. Personally I prefer the Driller’s Method. Operations do not cease, the crew is kept busy, the influx is out of the well quicker and the well is continually being circulated. True, there were so many mistakes it's almost impossible to put your finger on one thing that could have changed everything. Clearly they put everything on there being a perfect cement job, then did nothing to guarantee they had one. They replaced the kill mud downhole with seawater and their goose was beginning to cook. I concur with your "driller's method", but remember, from BP's perspective drilling was over and this was a temporary abandon until production could begin. 1 Quote Share this post Link to post Share on other sites
Old-Ruffneck + 1,246 er February 23, 2020 11 hours ago, James Regan said: The mud offload should not be confused to the point where if the mud was onboard it would have been used to kill the well. The mud circulating system got overloaded regardless of how much mud you had on board it was too late, no conventional well kill would have been fast enough for this brute even the Wait and Weight method considered the safest was impossible the primary well control was compromised and secondary was ineffective. That is pretty much spot-on @James Regan. Everything happened too fast and "brute force" of the well pressure and in theory cut-off rams should have sealed the well in. 1 hour ago, Ward Smith said: True, there were so many mistakes it's almost impossible to put your finger on one thing that could have changed everything. And this statement fairly well sums it up. I can say now, lessons were learned by this horrific mishap and changed the industry. Will this happen again? I say without a doubt as we put more rigs out in the seas. But also on land there is still a lot of high pressure zones untapped and experience is our best teacher. And we pray for those lost. My driller had a saying to every new hand, "Swinging iron will win everytime on flesh". 2 Quote Share this post Link to post Share on other sites
Douglas Buckland + 6,308 February 24, 2020 On 2/23/2020 at 2:17 AM, El Nikko said: The Schlum crew were onboard but were sent home without running the CBL probably to save money/time. After all the problems that well had it seems insane not to run the CBL Run a CBL on the liner lap? The original inflow test already showed that the lap was leaking, so I do not see a benefit in spending time on a CBL at this point. Better to kill the well, run another liner hanger seal assembly and perform another inflow test. If desired, and the liner lap tested good, a CBL could have been run at this point. Quote Share this post Link to post Share on other sites
Douglas Buckland + 6,308 February 24, 2020 11 hours ago, El Nikko said: I've been looking for that for ages and can't find it, saddly I lost a massive amount of collected resources over the years. Do you have the calculation? For some reason the number 278 keeps springing to mind, that might the the depth at which gas breaks out in OBM and expands massively close to surface? Boyle’s Law.... Rough ‘Rule of Thimb’ is that the volume will double every time the pressure/deprh is reduced by half. One cubic foot at 10,000’ becomes two cubic feet at 5,000’. This then becomes four at 2,500’, eight at 1,125’ and so forth. 1 1 Quote Share this post Link to post Share on other sites
Douglas Buckland + 6,308 February 24, 2020 “...but remember, from BP's perspective drilling was over and this was a temporary abandon until production could begin. “ Not quite accurate. Yes, the actual drilling had been completed but there is absolutely no was the well had been temporarily abandonded. How can you label a well as ‘temporarily abandoned’ when you are busy testing the liner lap? I will repeat. Once they disbelieved the results of the initial inflow test (and began taking steps to disprove it), unseated the test packer and allowed gas past this packer, they had absolutely zero chance of preventing a blowout! Yes, they were offliading mud and had done some work at surface which made the situation worse - but the rig was lost the instant they unseated that packer! Quote Share this post Link to post Share on other sites
Douglas Buckland + 6,308 February 24, 2020 Okay all you oilfield hands, this is copied and pasted directly from Wikipedia. Which one of you can ‘spot the bullshit’? Don’t all speak at once, raise your hands! “After the explosion, Adrian Rose stated that abnormal pressure had accumulated inside the marine riser and as it came up it "expanded rapidly and ignited."[13]According to BP's internal investigation, a bubble of methane gas escaped from the well and shot up the drill column, expanding quickly as it burst through several seals and barriers before exploding.[41] Rose said the event was basically a blowout.” Keep in mind that people think that if it is on Wikipedia...it is true! Quote Share this post Link to post Share on other sites
James Regan + 1,776 February 24, 2020 (edited) 12 hours ago, Douglas Buckland said: “...but remember, from BP's perspective drilling was over and this was a temporary abandon until production could begin. “ Not quite accurate. Yes, the actual drilling had been completed but there is absolutely no was the well had been temporarily abandonded. How can you label a well as ‘temporarily abandoned’ when you are busy testing the liner lap? I will repeat. Once they disbelieved the results of the initial inflow test (and began taking steps to disprove it), unseated the test packer and allowed gas past this packer, they had absolutely zero chance of preventing a blowout! Yes, they were offliading mud and had done some work at surface which made the situation worse - but the rig was lost the instant they unseated that packer! We are also not considering the fact that the BOP did not do its job and/or the crew and supervisors correctly. No well unloads it’s total volume at full velocity, the well speaks to you in small steps it’s up to the crew to communicate with the well and act. Unfortunately unless it’s pipe spewing out of the rotary not many people will have the balls to cut the pipe or EDS, that’s a fact. Edited February 24, 2020 by James Regan 2 Quote Share this post Link to post Share on other sites
El Nikko + 2,145 nb February 24, 2020 (edited) 18 hours ago, Douglas Buckland said: Boyle’s Law.... Rough ‘Rule of Thimb’ is that the volume will double every time the pressure/deprh is reduced by half. One cubic foot at 10,000’ becomes two cubic feet at 5,000’. This then becomes four at 2,500’, eight at 1,125’ and so forth. It's shocking what age does to ones memory Doug. Always pleased to say back in the day I caught every drill and every influx even as small as a barrel...not that you get any thanks for it 😆 If there is one thing I wish I still had was my mudlogger's tally book, I know these days they are considered low grade people on the rig but back 20 years ago it wasn't like that. Edited February 24, 2020 by El Nikko Quote Share this post Link to post Share on other sites
El Nikko + 2,145 nb February 24, 2020 19 hours ago, Douglas Buckland said: Boyle’s Law.... Rough ‘Rule of Thimb’ is that the volume will double every time the pressure/deprh is reduced by half. One cubic foot at 10,000’ becomes two cubic feet at 5,000’. This then becomes four at 2,500’, eight at 1,125’ and so forth. After pondering the 278 number in some distant half dead brain cell from the past, I wondered about 256...after a quick go with that equation I get 1 bbl influx of fluid would become 256 bbl at 35ft or so...I knew I was sort of right lol...typical geologist and their ballpark figures. 1 Quote Share this post Link to post Share on other sites
James Regan + 1,776 February 24, 2020 49 minutes ago, El Nikko said: After pondering the 278 number in some distant half dead brain cell from the past, I wondered about 256...after a quick go with that equation I get 1 bbl influx of fluid would become 256 bbl at 35ft or so...I knew I was sort of right lol...typical geologist and their ballpark figures. Is the gas not in a liquid state at these depths? Boyle’s law regarding the volume doubling is in regards to once it turns to gas. Then by rule of thumb every 200ft it doubles. My brain cells ain’t what they once were but happy to hear just how bad they have deteriorated 👍🏻 2 Quote Share this post Link to post Share on other sites
Douglas Buckland + 6,308 February 25, 2020 5 hours ago, El Nikko said: It's shocking what age does to ones memory Doug. Always pleased to say back in the day I caught every drill and every influx even as small as a barrel...not that you get any thanks for it 😆 If there is one thing I wish I still had was my mudlogger's tally book, I know these days they are considered low grade people on the rig but back 20 years ago it wasn't like that. Good mudloggers who actually understand their trade and their critical contribution to the drilling operation are a blessing to guys like me! Quote Share this post Link to post Share on other sites