Is Russia as an ally of China really in the interest of the United States?

[Tomasz + 1,608]

As far as I know, one of the assumptions of American geopolitics is that a new hegemon should not appear in Eurasia.
Taking into account the current state of affairs, in my opinion, the result of Western policy is that Russia has become China's junior partner lets say it clearly a vassal.
I am not saying that the fault is solely with the West. Russia is a country specific in many ways a little pathological one..
But the fact is, at least in the 90s, she was much more willing to cooperate with the West. Until the Georgian war, it reacted rather reactive to the actions of the West. In my opinion, it is worth listening to Putin's speech in Munich in 2007 because it is such a list of complaints on the part of Russia.
Of course, I know that Russia is a pathological country, but the result of Western policy is that for at least 10 years Russia has entered into a stronger and stronger relationship with China as a weaker partner in tandem.
It is, after all, a country of almost 150 million people with 17 million kilometers, the largest resource of raw materials in the world, modern military technologies that are still better than Chinese ones, yet a certain resource of civil technologies, including information technology, and what is worth emphasizing, and maybe not everyone knows about it with large resources well-educated people.
Maybe I am really stupid, but I don't understand the behavior of Western countries that generally force Russia to become increasingly dependent on China.
I do not blame only the West for this, because Russia is a very difficult partner, but I simply do not understand how it improves the geopolitical situation of the USA in the long term, especially since China is many times stronger than the USSR it ever was because it is much more powerful in terms of economy and population.
Someone will say that these situations can be easily reversed.
Note that, according to a 2019 Gallup poll, 29% of Russians have a positive opinion of the USA. 72% of respondents have a positive opinion of China. This is the biggest difference in the study.
I know, of course, that Russia is ruled by the Kremlin tops, not the sovereign, and secondly social feelings can be managed quickly and effectively.
I would just like to emphasize because I hear many times that when Putin is overthrown, the Russian society will choose a democracy and support the West. And I am reviewing various such studies of the Russian society and honestly it does not result from them in any way.
I realizes that if someone reads for example, the Western liberal press, he may think that the mood in Russia is generally pro-Western and pro-democratic.
However, if someone delves into the results of the research, even of a relatively independent Levada Institute he will find out that, especially after the Second Maidan, these moods are not pro-Western, especially pro-American, and in general the degree of anti-Western resentment over the last 30 years is definitely higher than in 1991 and it might be a suprise but this is best sign that  most Russians generally view the actions of the West as hostile to Russia.
 If you read the relevant research, many people may be surprised, but the Russians anno domini 2020 are definitely more anti-American than they were when the USSR collapsed in 1991.
There are even some Russian analyzes available, which show that within 10-15 years Russia's dependence on China will be so great that the freedom of maneuver and Russia's transition to the West camp will be very limited and even impossible
As I say, Russia is a pathological country, but is it really in the interest of even the USA at a time when China is its greatest rival?
Well, the only available explanation is unbridled greed. Sheer greed and pride that always comes first before the fall I will only mention the famous "too big to fail" and pumping public money into private banks. Unfortunately, the last one turns off the light.
After Putin, the West will have a "democratic leader " ala Shoygu or, worse, someone like General Lebed. Although it may sound strange, they may still miss Vladimir

Edited December 22, 2020 by Tomasz

[Marcin2 + 725]

1. Assumption of American geopolitics is that a new hegemon should not appear in Eurasia,as it is the only place where new hegemon can appear (China, India or Russia). But because new hegemon is large China 1.4 billion people, Russia 0.15 billion people cannot play pivotal role, cannot impact in any important way, how would China develop. Russia is just too small and too weak for this game. Russia is for China what Canada is for US. Without alliance with Canada United States would still have current position. In case of Russia and China it is nearly the same, the only difference is superior Russian military technology that China still needs.

Russian GDP is 1.7 trillion USD, about 12% of Chinese GDP that is 15 trillion USD (Again the same relation is between Canadian and US GDP).

Russian area is much larger than Chinese or US, but it is a weakness with relatively small Russian military budget and Russia needs China a lot in Central Asia.

Summary: Russia is too small and too weak a country to play any counterweight against China , and thus be useful for US.

2. Difficulty of approach. There is very limited way that United States can engage with Russia. There is an exclusive club of allied democracies and the rest of the world. And Russia is in the rest of the world. On top of that since annexation of Crimea Russia is a global outlaw with many sanctions. US co-operates with many vassal countries in Middle East and elsewhere, no problem. But always engagement is very limited, so any potential relation with Russia can be like with Saudi Arabia. It would be politically suicidal for any US politician to engage with Russia.

3. Lack of any meaningful US gains from any alliance with Russia. Russia is important cause it is an exporter of natural resources. No matter what, these resources would flow cause Russian economy needs budget  revenues.

Russia is too weak vs China so no gain in this area. Russian military needs export revenues, China is a very good client, and US is the strongest competitor for Russian military gear.

4. Russia is not an important part of global supply chains, not a beneficiary of globalization. It is a closed economy, closed society, not many people-people contacts. And at the end of the day it does not matter what Russian opinions are , it is Vladimir that decides. Opinion polls are important in democracies cause people have impact on government.

Edited December 23, 2020 by Marcin2
add

[Tomasz + 1,608]

Lets see attitude of Chinese

Quote

 

Neighbors don’t always make the best of friends but, faced with growing international tensions, China and Russia are being drawn closer together. It comes as Chinese citizens increasingly write off better relations with the US.

A new poll published by the widely read Global Times newspaper, which has close links to the ruling Chinese Communist Party, found that over half of the nearly 2,000 respondents viewed Russia as the country’s most important relationship.

There was a sharp reduction in the number of people saying that ties with the US had the biggest impact on China, dropping to only 47.5 percent, compared to 82.1 percent when the question was asked last year.

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Diao Daming, an expert on US studies at the Renmin University of China in Beijing, said the results showed Chinese people are “seriously offended by the unilateral moves made by the US government to harm bilateral ties; but, on the other [hand], their favorable impression toward American society and culture has not been affected too much by some irresponsible moves made by US politicians.” 

At the same time, China’s official state news network Xinhua reported on Monday that the country’s premier, Xi Jinping, and Russian President Vladimir Putin had shared warm words over future partnerships earlier this week. According to the outlet, which is closely linked with Chinese decision makers, the two leaders resolved to “unswervingly develop the comprehensive strategic partnership” between their countries.

Beijing has become the most significant commercial partner for Moscow, and the country is the leading destination for the export of Russian commodities, and a source of more than $56 trillion in imports. Some Western commentators have previously argued that China, the world’s most populous country, would struggle to see Russia as an equal partner given its growing monopolization of world trade. However, shared political obstacles with the EU and the US appear to be playing a role in the two nations stepping towards closer and closer political ties.

 

 

[Tomasz + 1,608]

On 12/23/2020 at 11:39 PM, Marcin2 said:

1. Assumption of American geopolitics is that a new hegemon should not appear in Eurasia,as it is the only place where new hegemon can appear (China, India or Russia). But because new hegemon is large China 1.4 billion people, Russia 0.15 billion people cannot play pivotal role, cannot impact in any important way, how would China develop. Russia is just too small and too weak for this game. Russia is for China what Canada is for US. Without alliance with Canada United States would still have current position. In case of Russia and China it is nearly the same, the only difference is superior Russian military technology that China still needs.

Russian GDP is 1.7 trillion USD, about 12% of Chinese GDP that is 15 trillion USD (Again the same relation is between Canadian and US GDP).

Russian area is much larger than Chinese or US, but it is a weakness with relatively small Russian military budget and Russia needs China a lot in Central Asia.

Summary: Russia is too small and too weak a country to play any counterweight against China , and thus be useful for US.

2. Difficulty of approach. There is very limited way that United States can engage with Russia. There is an exclusive club of allied democracies and the rest of the world. And Russia is in the rest of the world. On top of that since annexation of Crimea Russia is a global outlaw with many sanctions. US co-operates with many vassal countries in Middle East and elsewhere, no problem. But always engagement is very limited, so any potential relation with Russia can be like with Saudi Arabia. It would be politically suicidal for any US politician to engage with Russia.

3. Lack of any meaningful US gains from any alliance with Russia. Russia is important cause it is an exporter of natural resources. No matter what, these resources would flow cause Russian economy needs budget  revenues.

Russia is too weak vs China so no gain in this area. Russian military needs export revenues, China is a very good client, and US is the strongest competitor for Russian military gear.

4. Russia is not an important part of global supply chains, not a beneficiary of globalization. It is a closed economy, closed society, not many people-people contacts. And at the end of the day it does not matter what Russian opinions are , it is Vladimir that decides. Opinion polls are important in democracies cause people have impact on government.

You are probably right but let me show antoher persective. The Center for a New American Security published a report on the strengthening of China's position by alliance Russia and the cooperation of the these two countries in many critical sectors of the economy and security.

Particular attention was paid to the synergy of the actions of both countries, which gives a stronger effect on erosion of US influence than actions of China and Russia taken separately. The report is available at:

Navigating the Deepening Russia-China Partnership

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Ties between China and Russia have grown. In virtually every dimension of their relationship—from the diplomatic to defense and economic to informational realms—cooperation between Beijing and Moscow has increased. Political observers in Washington and beyond have noted their alignment, yet they remain divided over what these growing ties portend.

Perhaps the most concerning—and least understood—aspect of the Russia-China partnership is the synergy their actions will generate. Analysts understand well the challenges that Russia and China each pose to the United States. But little thought has been given to how their actions will combine, amplifying the impact of both actors. As this report highlights, the impact of Russia-China alignment is likely to be far greater than the sum of its parts, putting U.S. interests at risk globally.

The synergy between Russia and China will be most problematic in the way that it increases the challenge that China poses to the United States. Already, Beijing is working with Moscow to fill gaps in its military capabilities, accelerate its technological innovation, and complement its efforts to undermine U.S. global leadership. Simply put, Russia is amplifying America’s China challenge.

The synergy between Russia and China will be most problematic in the way that it increases the challenge that China poses to the United States.

Russia’s amplification of the China challenge will be most consequential for the United States on two fronts: the defense domain and the democracy and human rights domain. There are also several broader implications their cooperation will create for U.S. global influence:

Defense

Looking across all dimensions of their relationship, Russia-China cooperation is likely to create the most significant challenges for the United States in the defense domain. China is leveraging its relationship with Moscow to fill gaps in its capabilities. Deepening Sino-Russian defense relations amplify Russia and China’s ability to project power and more visibly and credibly signal to onlooking countries their willingness to challenge U.S. dominance in key regions. Their joint naval maneuvers with countries like Iran allow competitors to increase their power projection and force U.S. strategists to account for new scenarios.

Their cooperation accelerates their efforts to erode U.S. military advantages—a dynamic that is especially problematic for U.S. strategic competition with China in the Indo-Pacific. Russia already provides China advanced weapons systems that enhance China’s air defense, anti-ship, and submarine capabilities and better equip the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to keep the United States out of its backyard. The two countries are also increasing their technology cooperation, which could eventually allow them to innovate collectively faster than the United States can on its own, straining an already-stressed U.S. defense budget. Ultimately, sustained—and more problematically, deepening—Sino-Russian cooperation would put at risk America’s ability to deter Chinese aggression in the region and uphold its commitment to maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Democracy and Human Rights

Russia-China alignment poses significant risks to liberal democracy and the American way of life. The two countries have long sought to push back against Western democracy promotion, but since 2014 and again in the wake of COVID-19, it is apparent that China and Russia are doing much more than countering perceived support for “color revolutions” in their respective peripheries. They have gone on the offensive to undermine democracy and universal rights as the foundation of the current liberal order, and are learning from each other how to increase the efficacy of their tactics. Already, Russia and China are popularizing authoritarian governance, exporting their best practices, watering down human rights norms, backing each other up to defend strategic interests in multilateral forums, creating norms around cyber and internet sovereignty, and bolstering illiberal leaders and helping them stay in power. Some of this is more alignment than coordination. But the point is that they are singing from the same sheet of music, which increases the dose of their messaging. They legitimize each other’s actions, making them more persuasive with swing states, which will be crucial in determining the future trajectory of democracy.

Looking forward, policymakers should expect their anti-democratic synergy to continue. Washington will need to remain vigilant against the countries’ overlapping and potentially compounding efforts to interfere in America’s domestic politics. As Russia remains persistent in its drive to undermine U.S. democracy, China grows increasingly bold, and U.S.-China relations remain fraught. Beyond the United States, Russian narratives designed to undermine trust in institutions will create fertile ground for Chinese narratives about the failings of democracy and the superiority of authoritarian systems to take root. Beyond polluting the global information environment, Beijing and Moscow are likely to set forth alternative platforms by which information can be disseminated. This type of synergy is also likely to move into new spaces like artificial intelligence (AI) and other emerging technologies. In particular, Russia and China both offer models and different approaches to digital authoritarianism. Although they are pursuing different paths to utilizing technology to more effectively control their people, together they offer an array of options that make digital control more accessible and flexible for a broader swath of countries. Working together, they may also make advances in approaches to surveillance and predictive analysis.

Global Influence

Russia and China are aligned in their efforts to weaken cohesion among U.S. allies and partners and dilute U.S. sway with countries and international institutions. Moreover, Russia and China are working to reduce the centrality of the United States in the global economic system. Already, Moscow and Beijing are cooperating to obviate U.S. sanctions and export controls, mitigating the effects of U.S. economic pressure. If their partnership deepens, or even if each country individually builds up resilience to U.S. pressure, it would have the potential to dilute the efficacy of U.S. coercive financial tools, especially sanctions and export controls, which have been a key part of the U.S. foreign policy arsenal. The United States would have less ability to use such financial measures to isolate and constrain the unwanted actions of not just China and Russia but other countries that could tap into their networks to bypass U.S pressure. If their efforts at de-dollarization accelerate, for example, it would weaken Washington’s ability to enforce sanctions globally and impair U.S. anti-corruption, anti-money laundering, and other efforts that strengthen the global system.

To be successful in meeting this challenge, Washington will need to prioritize and advance several actions designed to collectively limit the depth of Russia and China’s partnership and mitigate the challenges their cooperation poses to U.S. interests and values. First, the United States should seek to change Russia’s calculus such that Moscow views some cooperation with the United States and Europe as possible and preferable to its growing subservience to China. The current realities in U.S.-Russia relations mean that moving in this direction would take time. Russian actions, including the Kremlin’s persistent efforts to target U.S. elections, amplify U.S. social divisions, and undermine U.S. faith in democratic institutions, will be the key factor limiting what is possible in the near term. The difficulties of lifting U.S. sanctions on Russia in the event that Moscow changes its policy course will be another obstacle. In the meantime, then, the United States should monitor and plan for, create headwinds to, and—where possible—pull at the seams in Russia-China relations. This report identifies policy recommendations in each of these categories.

The United States should not write off Russia-China relations as just an uncomfortable or unnatural partnership. But nor should Washington seek to counter their cooperation in every dimension of their partnership or compete intensely in every region. Instead, policymakers must be equipped with a more concrete understanding of how Russia-China relations are likely to evolve, an understanding of those areas where their cooperation (or even their aligned independent policy) would be most damaging to U.S. security and foreign policy interests, and a plan for navigating and disrupting the challenge. This report addresses these critical gaps in U.S. foreign policy thinking and planning.

 

Full report in PDF

https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/navigating-the-deepening-russia-china-partnership?fbclid=IwAR0KyGts9BPnFn2M-DWJB1l3IWTeIAojjt7L4stkJ49FLnAcP6XoJ3Qudn4

 

Edited January 16, 2021 by Tomasz